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Summary
The present capability and future effectiveness of America’s network of
emergency telecommunications services are among the issues under review by
Congress and other entities.  Emergency calls (911) on both wireline (landline) and
wireless networks are considered by many to be part of the public safety network.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that 911 call centers be included in planning for
emergency responses.  As technologies that can support 911  improve, many are
seeing the possibility of integrating 911 into a wider safety net of emergency
communications and alerts.  Without robust support and back-up, 911 systems can
be overwhelmed or rendered useless, as occurred in many locations after Hurricane
Katrina struck Gulf Coast communities on August 29, 2005.
One of the intents of Congress in passing the Wireless Communications and
Public Safety Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-81), and of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in  implementing the act, is to make 911 technology universally
available throughout the United States. A 2002 report, known as the Hatfield Report,
recognized the  need to upgrade 911 infrastructure nationwide, discussed some of the
difficulties encountered, and recommended the creation of a 911 bureau at the
Executive level.   Congress addressed recommendations from the Hatfield Report
with provisions that were passed in the ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-494).
This legislation creates a federal program for 911 implementation and coordination
and authorizes funds for a matching grant program.  Appropriations for the program
have yet to be allocated, although some funding is available through other programs.
Support for the program could come from a “Digital Transition and Public Safety
Fund,” proposed in the 2006 budget reconciliation process (S. 1932); up to $43.5
million is designated for 911 in that bill.
Legislation in the 109th Congress  covering 911 or call centers includes
companion bills S.1063 (Senator Nelson) and H.R.2418 (Representative Gordon) 
— focusing on assuring access to 911 call centers for users of Voice over Internet
protocol (VoIP) telephone service and on improving the delivery of 911 services
nationwide; companion bills S.211(Senator Clinton) and H.R.896 (Representative
Bilirakis) — concerning improvements in the capacity of municipal help services
provided by call centers;  H.R.214 (Representative Stearns) — providing for a new
regulatory category for Internet communications and also referencing 911 access for
VoIP users; H.R.733 (Representative Weiner) — seeking to assure service in
underground areas such as subway transportation systems and H.R. 4564
(Representative Thompson) - providing for the establishment of a national disaster
call center network.  Current transportation funding legislation (SAFETEA-LU, P.L.
109-59) has incorporated some language from companion bills S.611 (Senator
Collins) and H.R. 1240 (Representative Hefley) to establish advisory bodies that
support improvements in Emergency Medical Services, including 911 systems. 
This report reviews key points about the implementation of 911 and reviews
some of the ways in which it might be integrated with existing or envisioned
networks or services.   It will be updated.
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An Emergency Communications Safety Net:
Integrating 911 and Other Services
There is a growing realization among public safety officials, policy makers and
others that 911 services could be part of a larger solution for emergency
communications that links citizens with first responders and with emergency services
such as hospitals through an interconnected system of communications networks and
call centers.  911 networks might be part of a nationwide capacity that provides
communications interoperability; they might be linked to other networks that also
receive citizen-activated calls for help or assistance; they could also be incorporated
into emergency alert broadcasts.   Proposals for how to provide a fully integrated
emergency response system have not crystallized into a consensus.  The 9/11
Commission Report recommended that 911 call centers — also called Public Safety
Answering Points, or PSAPs — be included in planning for emergency responses.1
Congress, which has since 1999 passed two bills to further the deployment of 911,
is reviewing ways to expand 911 capabilities and make it more accessible and
effective.  Congress is also evaluating ways to improve emergency alerts2 and
interoperable communications for public safety.3  Operational convergence of
emergency communications seems to many to be inevitable, a question of “when,”
not “if.”  This report deals primarily with 911 and its recent history.  It also
summarizes some of the proposals that would improve 911 through new approaches
and integration with other services.
911 and Hurricane Katrina
Testifying before Congress in September 2005 about courses of action to
improve emergency communications, Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Chairman Kevin J. Martin proposed that 911 systems be made more robust, with
better backup capacity and recovery capabilities.4  From reports received, it appears
that emergency communications and 911 call centers in the Gulf Coast states were
overwhelmed after Hurricane Katrina and subsequent flooding took out radio
systems, cell towers and back-up generators.5  Regular landline telephone
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community.  Sources used are The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The Times-
Picayune, Communications Daily, Associated Press Online, The Bradenton Herald, The
Miami Herald, and Good Morning America.  Other information came from the Mississippi
Power Company, the Wireless Emergency Response Team, call center personnel, an e-mail
server operated by the National Emergency Number Association (NENA 911TALK), and
postings to the Times-Picayune website at [http://www.nola.com/].   
6 Written testimony of  Kevin J. Martin  Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
at hearing House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and the Internet, “Public Safety Communications from 9/11 to
Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons,” September 29, 2005.
7 Switches are programmed to recognize “911” and route these calls directly to the
appropriate Public Safety Answering Point.  
8 NENA 911TALK e-mail from Lisa Dodson, September 1, 2005.
9 Public Safety Answering Points, an essential service, can register for Telecommunications
Service Priority (TSP), which accords them a level of priority in the restoration of service.
TSP is a program of the National Communications System.  
connections can function after local power is lost, if central switches maintain power
and lines are not damaged; telephone switches  can usually operate  until their back-
up generators run out of fuel or are knocked out by flooding.  Similarly, cell towers
that carry commercial phone service and public safety radio communications can
continue to function with back-up power, usually batteries.  When the batteries and
the fuel run out, however, communications capability comes to an end.  The erratic
pattern of power outages and damaged equipment that resulted from the winds, storm
surges, heavy rains, and flooding from Hurricane Katrina helps to explain why some
communications links remained operational after others had failed.  
Calling for Help.  Although many people lost communications, many others
were able to connect to 911 centers where operators continued to take calls and
provide assistance, where possible.  The FCC has reported that upwards of 40 call
centers in Mississippi and Louisiana were fully or partially disabled after Hurricane
Katrina; by September 28, all but three were operational.6  The most significant loss
of capacity occurred in and around New Orleans.  Two telephone company switches
located in New Orleans that routed 911 calls for the surrounding parishes were
knocked out by flooding.7  In many cases, call centers affected by the loss of the
switches were able to receive calls from people who knew the10-digit number.  Some
people were able to reach relatives in unaffected areas, they in turn placed calls to
their own 911 call centers.  The 9-1-1 Coordinator for Harris County, Texas, for
example, reported receiving numerous such calls.  Lacking information about what
call centers were still functioning, or how to reach them, the Harris County operators
passed information to the Coast Guard unit in Alexandria, Louisiana, which in turn
relayed the calls for help.8
When BellSouth and other communications technicians arrived, they
reprogrammed local switches to reroute 911 calls, bypassing damaged switches.9  The
call centers that were able to continue operations (and many did, showing ingenuity,
perseverance, and fortitude) often lost contact with first responders because of
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inadequate radio communications networks.  Some communities overcame this
problem by sharing improvised quarters with first responders — no need for radios,
just walk across the room.
As in other disaster situations, the Internet proved less vulnerable to failure than
other telecommunications links.  Several of the area’s newspapers were able to
publish Internet editions and at least one local television station in New Orleans
reportedly sent video feeds to its website when it could no longer broadcast.  Short
Message Service (SMS) communications could be completed from cell phones
because SMS stores messages to forward when a radio frequency becomes available.
Voice calls over wireless networks require an immediate signal to get through.
Anyone with electrical or battery power and a computer terminal or wireless laptop
could access the Internet and those with Internet telephony were often able to reach
911 operators.  Cox Communications is reported to have said that it was able to
maintain some Internet service for many customers in affected areas and was able to
use generators to power VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) for local and 911calls.
Cox customers in New Orleans were able to place calls until the telephone switching
circuits failed.  In Baton Rouge, on Wednesday, August 31, about two-thirds of
Cox’s customers had VoIP.  Vonage, the VoIP service provider, responded to a call
for assistance from a hospital in Baton Rouge by installing Internet connections and
VoIP for emergency communications.
Amateur radio operators also play a role in providing communications during
and after emergency situations.  Radio calls for help from areas devastated by
Hurricane Katrina were picked up by operators in areas where phone service was still
working.  In some cases, amateur radio operators were able to contact 911 call
centers or rescue operations and relay the requests for help.  Amateur radio
volunteers also support the American Red Cross in providing communications at
their shelters.10
 
Response, Rescue and Recovery.  When they could, 911 call centers
reached first responders; but as power sources failed the ability to establish contact
with first responders diminished.  Cell towers went dead from lack of power
(typically back up power sources for public safety failed within hours) and then
walkie-talkies faded away.  As long as cell phone service held up, some first
responders were able to use their own phones to maintain some contact.  Generally
unable to talk to each other, local police and rescue personnel hunted randomly for
people who might need assistance.  
When rescue units arrived in the Gulf area many brought communications
equipment and power supplies with them — for themselves and for other emergency
workers.   The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for example, has
trucks that carry communications equipment for satellite, radio and landline
connections — and power generators. Some state and local emergency officials have
satellite phones or receive them from federal response units.  The majority of first
responders, however, rely on terrestrial radio.  Wireless telephone companies,
equipment suppliers, and various agencies bring in portable cell towers, called COWs
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(Cell on Wheels) and COLTS (Cell on Light Trucks), as well as extra radios to help
re-establish communications at the local level.  Some of the private sector supply
efforts are coordinated through the National Coordinating Center, part of the National
Communications System within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).11  By
Wednesday evening, August 31, emergency radio and other wireless equipment was
operational in most areas of the Gulf Coast, with more equipment arriving as fast as
it could be moved from staging areas outside the disaster area.  Not all areas hit by
the hurricane lost cell phone service, although capacity was reduced by power
outages and damage. (Wireline telephone and cable companies typically do not start
work on restoring service until power lines are repaired.) Private communications
network operators, when possible, made their facilities available for public safety.
The Mississippi Power Company, for example, handed out 300 walkie-talkies to
public safety officials to communicate with each other using the power company’s
fiber-optic cable backbone. Utility companies tend to have robust networks and many
of them have arrangements to aid public safety; in New York City, after September
11, Con Edison, the local power company, made its network available for emergency
communications. 
Mutual Aid.  Mutual Aid is a well-developed concept among first responders,
particularly among adjacent counties.   Mutual aid agreements are one of the tools for
improving communications interoperability.  On September 11, 2001, for example,
Capital Region emergency workers arriving at the Pentagon crash site benefitted from
previously established mutual aid agreements in organizing their response, sharing
resources, and coordinating communications.  
Emergency Management Association Compacts (EMACs) are a mechanism to
coordinate the provision of state-to-state mutual aid.  Emergency management
authorities within each state establish agreements with first responders and other
agencies for deploying assistance when requested, as well as managing training and
other planning decisions.  A state declaring an emergency can request assistance
through EMAC, which will match needs with available resources.  EMAC is
administered by the National Emergency Management Association.12   
Several states have included call center personnel in their emergency planning,
although it appears that, until Hurricane Katrina, PSAPs had not been authorized to
be deployed through EMAC.  In North Carolina, the state Office of Emergency
Management, working with the state chapter of the National Emergency Number
Association (NENA), has set up a Telecommunications Emergency Response
Taskforce (TERT).  Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the NC TERT had been deployed in
several state emergencies to assist in 911call centers.  When a group from the NC
TERT proposed to send assistance to a PSAP in a devastated area of the Gulf Coast,
it was learned that 911 call center personnel are not included as a category under
EMAC.  This oversight was rectified with the cooperation of the Louisiana Office of
Emergency Management, working through EMAC.  Shortly before midnight on
September 4, 2005, a team of personnel from five North Carolina PSAPs set out for
St. Tammany’s Parish, near New Orleans, arriving the next afternoon.  Shortly after
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13 Information in this paragraph was provided in e-mails sent by Craig Whittington, 9-1-1
Coordinator, Guilford Metro 9-1-1, Greensboro, NC and in a telephone conversation with
Woody Glover, Director, St. Tammany Parish Communications District, Covington, LA, on
September 3, 2005. 
14 More information at [http://www.nena.org/Events/CIF/TERT.htm].  Viewed November
1, 2005
15 P.L. 106-81, “Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999.”
16 Automatic Number Identification (ANI) recognizes and displays the telephone number
from which the call is placed.  Automatic Location Identification (ALI) provides — in the
case of wireline — the address associated with the telephone number or — in the case of
wireless — the approximate geographic co-ordinates of the caller.
arrival, the NC TERT team took over the task of responding to 911 calls —
reportedly the phones were “ringing off the hook” — relieving people who had been
working virtually non-stop for a week.  Many in the call center had been sleeping on
cots in the courthouse, which served as the parish’s emergency command center;
some of them had no homes to return to.13
Building on the experiences of the NC TERT and other state 911 teams who
were able to offer assistance, NENA has created a task force to coordinate a
nationwide capability for telecommunications emergency response teams.14  The goal
is to encourage states to establish TERTs, with NENA providing logistics support in
setting up interstate mutual aid agreements and in working with FEMA and EMAC.
          
Going Forward.  The balance of this report discusses the existing situation of
911’s capacity to respond in emergencies, some proposals to improve the system, and
recent legislative activity.  Proposals include better connections between 911 call
centers and emergency responders, building a more robust capacity, incorporating
Internet protocols, developing the capacity to set up call centers after disasters have
occurred, and coordinating 911 with other types of call centers, such as the 211
centers that provide municipal services.  Although not discussed above, 211 call
centers played a role in relief efforts after the recent hurricanes, for example,
providing assistance in finding shelter and social services.  
911: Legislation, Regulation and Leadership
To facilitate the effort to provide comprehensive 911 services nationwide,
Congress in 1999 passed the “911 Act,”15 which mandated 911 as the emergency
number nationwide and made numerous provisions for its implementation.  Among
other provisions, the law requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to work with the states and the many other affected parties to deploy comprehensive
wireless enhanced 911 (W-E911) service.  Enhanced 911 service provides 911 call
centers — known as Public Safety Answering Points, or PSAPs — with Automatic
Number Identification (ANI) and Automatic Location Identification (ALI).16    Most,
but not all wireline phones are automatically enabled for ANI/ALI display; an
estimated 99% of the population in the United States has access to some type of 911
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service and 93% of counties with 911 coverage have enhanced 911.17   Since October,
1, 2001, wireless carriers have been expected to meet FCC guidelines for providing
W-E911 to PSAPs. Most areas of the United States now have at least some wireless
enhanced 911 coverage, but only 38.9% of counties have fully implemented the
technology.18 
 
FCC Study. Delays and complications in implementing W-E911 prompted
the FCC to commission a study to examine the state of 911 capacity in general and
the cause of problems with wireless 911 in particular.   “Report on Technical and
Operational Issues Impacting the Provision of Wireless Enhanced 911 Services,”
known as the Hatfield Report, was submitted to the FCC on  October 15, 2002.19  The
author, Dale N. Hatfield, formerly Chief, Office of Engineering and Technology at
the FCC, was assisted in his research by staff in the FCC’s Commercial Wireless
Division of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau.  As its title indicates, the
report’s focus is primarily on technical and operational issues. 
Observations in the report that might be the basis for policy initiatives include
! The critical nature of location information in enhanced 911 in
supporting first responders in emergencies.
! The “seriously antiquated” condition of the infrastructure that
underlies 911 for both wireline and wireless emergency calls. 
! The need for a national 911 office to act as  a “champion” at the
federal level.
Congress responded to the issues raised in The Hatfield Report and by the 9/11
Commission and others with the ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-494).  It
created a E-911 Implementation Coordination Office within the federal government.
It also addressed a number of concerns that had been raised about the deployment of
911, including compliance, coverage in rural areas, and the use of fees levied by
states and localities to help cover the cost of providing 911 services.  
Regulation.   Since October, 1, 2001, wireless carriers have been expected to
meet FCC guidelines for providing W-E911 to PSAPs.  The FCC took an important
first step toward adopting rules for W-E911 in 1996 with a first Report and Order
(FCC 96-264) citing provisions of the Communications Act20 as the basis for its
action. To facilitate the effort to provide comprehensive 911 services nationwide,
Congress in 1999 passed the “911 Act,”21 which mandated 911 as the emergency
number nationwide and made numerous provisions for its implementation.  Among
CRS-7
22 Automatic Number Identification (ANI) recognizes and displays the telephone number
from which the call is placed.  Automatic Location Identification (ALI) provides — in the
case of wireline — the address associated with the telephone number or — in the case of
wireless — the approximate geographic co-ordinates of the caller.
23  For example, in 1997, the FCC recognized the possibility of  handset-based solutions for
Phase II, whereas previously it had discussed only  network solutions ( “E911
Reconsideration Order,” December 1, 1997).  Handset-based technology requires alterations
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for network-based solutions (“Third Report and Order,” October 6, 1999).
24 See [http://www.nric.org/].  Viewed January 26, 2006.
25 NRIC VII, Focus Group 1D, Communications Issues for Emergency Communications
Beyond 911; Report #1 - Properties and network architectures that communications between
PSAPs and emergency services personnel must meet in the near future ,” December 6, 2004,
pp. 12; 26-27  [http://nric.org/meetings/docs/meeting_20041206/FG1D%20Final%20Report.
pdf]. Viewed January 26, 2006.
other provisions, the law requires the FCC to work with the states and the many other
affected parties to deploy comprehensive W-E911 service.
The FCC plotted a course for reaching W-E911 in two phases. For Phase I, the
carriers were given a year to prepare for PSAP requests for Automatic Number
Identification (ANI) and location-finder capabilities using technology existing at the
time.  By 2001, for Phase II, the carriers were to have identified and implemented
new location-finder technologies (Automatic Location Identification, or ALI).22
From 1997 through 2000, the FCC made several changes in its accuracy
requirements, impacting the carriers’ ability to develop the needed ALI technology.23
In particular, the FCC set up different timetables for carriers using network-based
technologies for supplying locations information and those using technologies that
required new handsets.  By December 31, 2005, for carriers using handset-based
solutions, 100% of new mobile phones supplied to customers are required to be
Phase II compliant and 95% of the carriers’ customers must have Phase II
technology.  Difficulties in meeting the latter requirement will be discussed in the
next section of this report.
After the publication of the Hatfield Report in 2002, the FCC undertook several
new initiatives to bolster its role in supporting 911.  These included creating an
Enhanced 911 (E911) Coordination Initiative to bring together relevant stakeholders
to foster cooperation.  The FCC also supports the National Reliability and
Interoperability Council (NRIC VII), a Federal Advisory Committee that provides
best practices and other guidelines for telecommunications operations, including
homeland security and public safety.24  NRIC VII has four focus groups for E911
issues, including one studying interfacing PSAPs with  the wider universe of public
safety networks.25 
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[http://nena.org/dot/].  Both viewed January 26, 2006.
27 Program updates are provided at [http://www.its.dot.gov/ng911/ng911_overview.htm].
Viewed January 26, 2006.
28 “DOT Seeks Comment on Next Generation 911 Initiative,” ITS America News, February
16, 2005 at [http://www.itsa.org/ITSNEWS.NSF/0/09888ebfdcec0b5885256fab00075911?
OpenDocument]. Viewed January 26, 2006.
29 P.L. 108-494, Section 104, Section 158, (a).
30 P.L. 108-494, Section 104, Section 158, (a) (4).  
Leadership.  In its 1996 blueprint for implementing W-E911, the FCC noted
that introducing the service nationwide would require coordination and “cooperative
efforts by state and local governments, PSAP administrators, wireless carriers and
equipment manufacturers.”  The FCC has limited its  leadership role to encouraging
states and communities to work together in developing coordinated plans for W-
E911. Charged in the 911 Act to take positive steps to address the implementation
of 911 services, the FCC has primarily played the role of regulator and mediator. 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) in recent years has moved forward to
assist wireless E-911 as an extension of its highway safety programs.  In 2002, DOT
created a pro-active program to foster cooperation and dialog among key participants.
Among other actions, a partnership between DOT and three public safety associations
was formed in support of a Wireless Implementation Program.26  In 2005, DOT
announced plans to produce a national framework and deployment plan for a Next
Generation 911 (NG911) system, to be developed over a three-year period.27  The
NG911 Initiative is to be a “major new component” of the Intelligent Transportation
Systems Program.28 
The ENHANCE 911 Act designates the Director of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)  and the Administrator
of National Highway Traffic Safety as co-administrators of the to-be-created E-911
Implementation Coordination Office.29  These co-administrators would report to
Congress annually on activities “to improve coordination and communication with
respect to the implementation of E-911 services.”30  
911 Policy and Issues
While some key issues concerning the development of 911 have been
specifically addressed by the ENHANCE 911 Act, others remain.  Some could be
addressed by the E-911 Implementation Coordination Office.  The FCC also
continues to take regulatory steps to improve the delivery and availability of 911.
Bills that would address specific problems have been introduced in the 109th
Congress.  
Compliance and Location Accuracy.  Wireless carriers must meet
standards for accuracy (ability of the technology to locate the caller within a specified
number of meters); market penetration (for example, all new handsets); and
timeliness (for example, complying with a PSAP request within six months). To
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avoid penalties, carriers that cannot comply with W-E911 requirements must request
waivers. For enforcement purposes, the FCC has divided wireless carriers into three
tiers.  Small (Tier III) and mid-sized carriers (Tier II) are treated as one group with
its own administrative schedule for compliance.  Tier I carriers are the largest carriers
(Verizon, Cingular,T-Mobile, and Sprint Nextel) that collectively have over 80% of
the wireless market nationwide.  These are considered as a separate group and closely
monitored by the FCC for compliance. 
A coalition of Tier III companies asked the FCC to ease standards for location
accuracy for Tier III carriers, especially those in rural areas.31  Wireless carriers face
specific problems in implementing location-finding technology in rural areas.  These
include the use of analog as opposed to digital cellular services (digital technology
provides significantly better location-finding capability), the difficulty of installing
a sufficient number of cell towers to provide “triangulation” for location
technologies; and the predominance of cell towers placed along major highways
(sometimes referred to as a “string of pearls”), also a complication for  proper
triangulation. For these and other reasons, location identification in more densely-
populated areas provides a greater degree of accuracy than for rural areas.  The FCC
rules permit a wireless carrier to meet location-accuracy requirements by averaging
location performance systemwide. Carriers that specialize in meeting the niche
market needs of rural customers do not have the option of averaging their system’s
accuracy with better-performing data from urban/suburban areas.  As a consequence,
many are struggling to meet the FCC’s requirements for accuracy in location
identification.  Reflecting concerns that some carriers would stop serving remote
areas rather than invest in improving location identification capabilities, the
ENHANCE 911 Act directed the FCC to grant waivers in situations where strict
enforcement would decrease access to emergency services.32 
The ENHANCE 911 Act also required the FCC to study the situation of Tier III
wireless carriers regarding the waiver process and providing information on effective
technologies for implementing Phase II of W-E911.33   The FCC submitted a detailed
report in April 2005 but made no recommendations regarding technology.34  In the
same time frame, the FCC granted a blanket waiver to Tier III companies regarding
coverage of their customer base (see next section).
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The Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International, Inc.
(APCO) received $750,000 from the Public Safety Foundation to conduct an
independent test of the accuracy of location information received by PSAPs.35  APCO
has petitioned the FCC to apply a uniform standard for location accuracy in areas
served, disallowing national averaging used by large carriers to measure compliance
with W-E911.36  APCO recommends that accuracy requirements be set at the level
of Metropolitan Statistical Areas and Rural Statistical Areas.37  The FCC’s Advisory
Council, NRIC VII, has recommended that accuracy requirements be measured at the
state level.38  A tightening of accuracy rules would force improvements in the quality
of location information but would not solve all the problems of getting useful
location information to PSAPs.  High rise buildings, for example, pose another set
of problems; even though X-Y coordinates might accurately identify a street corner,
it does not identify whether the caller is on the fourth floor or the fortieth.39  The
debate regarding tighter requirements for location accuracy is ongoing.40
Coverage of Customer Base.  In addition to meeting standards for accuracy
of location information, carriers using handset solutions for location identification
must meet levels of distribution of Phase II compliant handsets to their customer
base.  By December 31, 2005, all new mobile phones provided to customers must
have Phase II location information technology and 95% of a carrier’s customer base
must be using Phase II compliant phones.  
A petition filed with the FCC by the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet
Association (CTIA) and the Rural Communications Association (RCA) summarizes
the difficulties being met by carriers depending on handset technology to comply
with Phase II.  These include 1) lower replacement rate for phones than anticipated
by the FCC; 2) lowered churn rates as more customers remain with existing wireless
carriers, keeping the phones they already have; and 3) unwillingness to replace
phones for location technology capabilities.   Customers apparently are satisfied with
the current features in their cell phones and are reluctant to replace them with a phone
in order to gain location-identification technology.  In rural areas, the primary reason
might be a desire to keep an analog cell phone because it provides better local
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coverage; analog signals travel greater distances than digital ones, which is
significant in areas with a limited number of transmission towers. (Phase II location
technology requires a digital phone.)  Among other possible reasons are consumer
awareness of low penetration rates of Phase II capabilities at local PSAPs —
rendering the location technology ineffective for 911 purposes — and privacy
concerns; many citizens are uninformed about how location technology works and
some fear that anyone will be able to know where they are, at any time, without their
consent.41  The petition requests the FCC to suspend the 95% market penetration rate
for carriers that are meeting compliance rules for new phones.  Alternatively, the
FCC could set up a streamlined waiver process for companies falling short of the
95% requirement.  Some Tier III companies have received waivers from this
requirement.42  As reported by the press, the CTIA/RSA petition is echoed by
statements and requests for waivers from some of the wireless companies that use
handset technologies for location identification. Carriers that use network technology
to meet Phase II requirements are not affected by the deadline.
Reflecting the difficulties reported by carriers, some analog telephone users
have encountered service problems when they have switched from analog to digital
phones. An undetermined number of customers in suburban and rural areas find that
their new digital phones place them out of range of towers that can receive digital
signals.  Calls — including 911 calls — that went through on their analog phones can
no longer be completed. Because of compliance requirements, carriers do not want
to provide new analog phones, nor replace broken ones.  The protection of rural
customers that Congress intended by urging relief for Tier III carriers does not apply
to rural customers of larger companies, including locally-operated subsidiaries.  
911 Funding.  The bulk of the costs for implementing wireless E911 is
covered by the telecommunications industry and by consumers, primarily as
taxpayers at the state and local level but potentially also as purchasers of wireless
handsets and subscriber services, since some of the carriers’ costs for E911
technology may be passed along as price increases.   One common source of funds
is a surcharge on telephone bills collected at the local or state level, or both.  Most
states have some form of 911 fund that receives revenue from a surcharge on
telephone bills.43   Another source at the local or county level is an increase in
property taxes with the additional monies going to an E911 fund. 
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According to the CTIA, of the 18 states known to have wireless E911 programs
funded at the state level, nine have transferred these funds to a general fund in recent
years. The table below was prepared in early 2003 and is not comprehensive.
California, for example, borrowed $63.1 million from its 911 fund in 2003.44  On a
smaller scale, the Maine Legislature voted to transfer $123,301 to the 2003 General
Fund from the state’s Emergency Services Communication Bureau’s E-911 Fund.45
Table 1.  E911 Funds Diverted to General Funding
State Amount(s) Year(s)
California $50 million 2001
District of Columbia $9.45 million over three
years
2000-2003
Maryland $1 million 2002
North Carolina $2.5 million; $5 million 2001; 2002




Oregon $7 million 2002
South Carolina $5 million 2003
Texas $40 million 2001
Virginia $30 million 2002
Source: CTIA, March 2003
The ENHANCE 911 Act provides a mechanism for funding 911 with a program
of matching grants.46  To penalize states and other jurisdictions that use 911 fees  for
other purposes, the act would deny grants to entities that diverted funds.47  For this
legislative response to be effective requires appropriations for the programs that the
act authorizes.   Funding of up to $250,000,000 for each fiscal year from 2005
through 2009 for matching grant programs has been authorized.48  Lacking the
necessary appropriations, the 911 programs outlined in the act have not moved
forward.  Funding of up to $43.5 million would be made available after June 2008
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under provisions contained in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (S. 1932, S.Rept.
109-362).49 
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP).  Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
does not automatically provide location information to a PSAP, unlike most wireline
and an increasing percentage of wireless 911 phone calls.  VoIP uses Internet
bandwidth to send voice communications; these can be peer-to-peer, essentially a
closed loop, or through a public switched telephone network (PSTN), communicating
over telephone lines. To achieve ANI/ALI delivery to a PSAP, there must be a
connection to a local telephone switch that links to the appropriate PSAP and the
VoIP user must register the phone number and address of the phone line used for
VoIP.  As the service has become more popular, often replacing a household’s
wireline phone, it has become evident that the absence of automated location
identification represents a serious hole in the 911 public safety net.  The FCC,
therefore, is pursuing actions to assure 911 access for VoIP users, particularly as
regards access to PSTN lines to 911 call centers and provision of ANI/ALI data.
Current requirements established by the FCC have two parts.  First,  VoIP providers
must contact all subscribers and inform them of the terms on which 911 access is or
is not available.  Second, VoIP providers are to meet FCC requirements for assuring
that 911 calls are delivered to PSAPs and provide ANI/ALI data.50  
In response to VoIP provider concerns about how to meet the technical
requirements of the FCC, the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) has
prepared recommendations for developing an architecture to connect VoIP to the
existing emergency network infrastructure, both for the interim and long term.51 
NENA states that VoIP is “poised to become the predominant technology used in the
telecommunications industry.”52 
Static vs. Nomadic VoIP.  A contentious issue revolves around differences
in connectivity for static and nomadic services.  Static VoIP applies primarily to
cable companies that offer VoIP as part of broadband Internet, delivered by coaxial
cable.  The VoIP service is linked to an Internet connection that is in a fixed place.
Nomadic VoIP refers to service that can be used anywhere that there is Internet
access.  Vonage, for example, a major provider of VoIP, can be used through any
Internet Service Provider (ISP); VoIP over wireless (usually Wi-Fi) will work
wherever there is a link.  Static VoIP requires a one-time registration of a
subscriber’s phone number and address.  Nomadic VoIP has a different set of
operating criteria that can accommodate constant revision of location information.
Nomadic VoIP is analogous to cell phones in terms of portability. 
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Citizen-Activated Emergency Calls.  PSAPs are not the only call centers
that handle requests for assistance or information in an emergency. Call centers are
identified as a pivotal link in an end-to-end network of emergency communications,
information, response, and post-incident care.  A report by the Wireless Emergency
Response Team (WERT) discusses the valuable help provided to victims of the
World Trade Center attack through call center services donated by BellSouth.53   The
report urges that national planning for emergency preparedness and response include
the mobilization of private-sector call centers to field calls for information and
assistance for non-life-threatening needs.54  Citizen-activated calls for help currently
go to 911, to 311, to 211, and to other call centers in both the public and private
sector.55  The 311 code was created by the FCC in 1997 to take non-emergency calls
police calls as a means to reduce congestion on 911 lines.56  Many cities have adopted
shared-service communications hubs using 311 as a way to consolidate agency call
centers.57  The 211 dialing code is reserved by the FCC on a provisional basis as a
universal number for community information and referral.58  The 211 call centers
support a variety of social service hot lines and can also be used to provide
information and guidance in emergency situations.
The Next Generation of Emergency Communications.  NENA is
pressing for what it calls “NG-E9-1-1,” referring to next generation technologies.
NENA wants to address the technical, operational and policy issues associated with
modernizing the E911 system and integrating new technologies, such as voice over
IP, instant messaging, short message service messaging, Wi-Fi, geographic
information systems and video.59   As noted above, the Department of Transportation
is seeking to develop a plan for NG911 as part of the Intelligent Transportation
Systems Program; and the National Interoperability and Reliability Council for the
FCC has urged the development of a common platform that would link 911 to an
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interoperable communications network based on Internet technologies. The Alliance
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions has a forum on emergency service
interoperability.60  Others, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force, are also
reportedly contributing to the effort to find common platforms and standards to allow
interoperability for the next generation of  technology.61
Congress and the Emergency Communications Safety Net
Enhanced technology and heightened awareness of the public safety and
homeland security benefits of emergency call centers have raised the bar of
expectations both within the public safety community and of the those who need 911
services.  The 9/11 Commission, among others, has urged Congress to advance on
the goal of integrating 911 with emergency response programs. 
Some public safety associations62 envision robust emergency communications
systems that connect first responders and health facilities with emergency call centers
that are also linked to all-hazard warning systems.  These systems would be built on
a backbone using Internet protocols.  S. 1063 (Senator Nelson) and H.R. 2418
(Representative Gordon) — the IP-Enabled Voice Communications and Public
Safety Act of 2005 — carry the requirement that the  E-911 Implementation
Coordination Office provide a plan to migrate to a “national IP-enabled emergency
network capable of receiving and responding to all citizen activated emergency
communications.”63  
Language in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users, SAFETEA-LU (P.L. 109-59) provides for the creation of
Federal Interagency Committee on Emergency Medical Services to  coordinate
emergency medical services and 9-1-1 systems.64  This action codifies an existing
Department of Transportation-sponsored committee that  addresses the
interdependence of EMS and 911 systems and coordinates among agencies and
government services at all levels.  It incorporates language from companion bills
H.R. 1240 (Representative Hefley) and  S. 611(Senator Collins).  A key provision of
the two bills that is not included in the law is the creation and support of a
community-based Advisory Council to make recommendations to the Committee.65
Companion bills introduced in the House (H.R. 896, Representative Bilirakis)
and Senate (S. 211, Senator Clinton) would facilitate nationwide availability of 211.
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The Calling for 2-1-1 bills recognize the potential role of 211 call centers in
providing “community preparedness and response.”66  A grants program would be
administered by the Department of Commerce.  Applicants would have to include
information about cooperation, if any, with other call centers, including 911.67 
Problems in providing 911 access for VoIP calls are addressed in the IP-Enabled
Voice Communications and Public Safety bills (H.R. 2418 and S. 1063) and also, in
a limited way, by H.R. 214 (Representative Stearns).68  H.R. 214, the Advanced
Internet Communications Service Act, would establish a regulatory framework for
Internet communications that is separate from telecommunications regulation.69   The
IP-Enabled Voice Communications and Public Safety bills (H.R. 2418 and S. 1063)
would provide specific requirements and protections for 911 and enhanced 911 calls
using VoIP;70 the bills also permit states and communities to impose fees on VoIP
billings to customers, as is commonly done for wireline and wireless phone bills.71
The Subway Cell Access Act (H.R. 733, Representative Weiner) would require
the FCC to regulate wireless telephone providers to assure wireless connectivity to
911 call centers from underground transit stations.
The Securing Useful and Responsive Giving in Emergencies (SURGE) Act
(H.R. 4564, Representative Thompson) includes a provision for the establishment of
a national disaster call center network.72  The purpose of the network would be to
facilitate contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the
expediting of needed relief.
